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1 Introduction
EU legislation, along with the European Court of Justice (CJEU) inter-
pretative intervention, has directly1 and indirectly2 influenced substan-
tive private law.3 This chapter questions the ‘humaneness’ of this
influence on the provision of health care.4
‘European private law’ is understood broadly in this chapter: it
embraces ‘all legal rules concerning relationships between private parties
regardless of the nature of the law, public or private, in which they have
been included in national legal systems’.5 This definition echoes the
regulatory nature of the acquis communautaire in the field of private
law.6 In a similar vein, Mak labels European (regulatory) private law as
The authors are most grateful for the wonderful feedback received on earlier versions of this
chapter from Nuno Ferreira and Dora Kostakopoulou.
1 For example, in the effort to address consumer, labour, anti-discrimination, and business
law matters.
2 For example, in the effort to liberalise markets, such as telecommunication, postal services,
energy, transport, and health care.
3 This chapter only deals with substantive private law. It does not consider rules of civil
procedure.
4 We define ‘health care’ herein the same way as it is defined in Article 3(a) of the EU’s
Patient’s Rights Directive: as ‘health service provided by health professionals to patients to
assess, maintain or restore their state of health, including the prescription, dispensation
and provision of medical products and medical devices’.
5 O Cherednychenko, ‘Fundamental Rights, European Private Law, and Financial Services’
in H-W Micklitz (ed) The Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014) 171.
6 See H-W Micklitz, ‘The Concept of Competitive Contract Law’ (2005) 23 Penn State
International Law Review 549; C U Schmid, ‘The Instrumentalist Conception of the
Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and Its Implications on a European Contract
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the rules laid down by the EU that seek ‘to facilitate private law relation-
ships whilst also pursuing specific policy goals, such as consumer protec-
tion or the integration of the EU internal market’.7
‘Private law relationships’ involve natural or legal persons other than a
public authority. Private parties can be individual citizens, commercial
undertakings not predominantly owned by public authorities, non-
governmental organisations, associations, foundations, trade unions, or
even political parties.8 Typical categories of legal relationships between
private parties include contractual relationships, tortfeasor–victim rela-
tionships, relationships concerning rights on movable/immovable prop-
erty, family relationships, and succession relationships.9
In line with the above mentioned broad understanding of European
private law, Grundmann demonstrates that EU law seeks to protect
private law relationships in three instances:10 protection against state
power (e.g. by subjecting national legislation to the demanding case law
on fundamental freedoms), protection against cartels and dominant
Law Code’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 210; F Cafaggi, ‘Introduction’, in F.
Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford University
Press, 2006) 1; H Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European Union of the
Changing Character of Private Law’ in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt (eds), Making of
European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward Elgar, 2008) 269; F Cafaggi and H
Muir-Watt (eds) The Regulatory Function of European Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2009);
H-W Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law. The Transform-
ation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and
Regulation’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 3.
7 V Mak, ‘The Consumer in European Regulatory Private Law’ (2015) 5 Tilburg Private
Law Working Paper 2.
8 See A Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Judicial Gov-
ernance’, in H Micklitz (ed), The Constitutionalisation of European Private Law (Oxford
University Press, 2014) 102 at 103. For an insight to the different concepts of ‘private law
relationships’, see the chapters by Leczykiewicz and Weatherill, Claes, Reich, Dougan,
Hesselink, Mak and Freedland in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Involvement
of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart Publishing, 2013).
9 Confer the four pillars ‘Contract’, ‘Tort’, ‘Property’ and ‘Family’ in G Brüggemeier, A
Colombi Ciacchi and G Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the
European Union. Volume 1: A Comparative Overview (Cambridge University Press,
2010). See in particular G Brüggemeier, A Colombi Ciacchi and G Comandé, ‘Introduc-
tion’, ibid, 4.
10 S Grundmann, ‘The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 Years of European and
European Business Law’ (2008) 4 European Review of Private Law 580. Grundmann
evidences how these aspects of EU law are largely in line with Böhm’s seminal concept of
a Private Law Society. In this respect, see also: A McCann, ‘The CJEU on Trial: Economic
Mobility and Social Justice’ (2014) 22(5) European Review of Private Law 729–768.
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positions (e.g. by applying competition rules and the horizontal effect of
fundamental freedoms), and protection against other structural imbal-
ances between private parties (e.g. by developing anti-discrimination
rules and consumer protection measures).
The discussion in this chapter embraces this progressive understand-
ing of European private law. The focus here, however, is on a relatively
small yet politically salient part of the said field. It relates to four
instances of EU law that regulate private law relationships concerning
health care: (1) the relevant CJEU judgments on cross-border healthcare
and the Patient Rights Directive; (2) the consumer law Directives applic-
able also to health-related contractual relationships; (3) EU legislation on
safety standards for products, food, pharmaceuticals, and medical
devices; and (4) the possible impact of the full harmonisation under the
Product Liability Directive on the level of health protection.
In line with the overall orientation of this volume, an institution has a
‘human face’ if it adequately takes basic human interests into account. As
mentioned in the Introduction to this volume, considerable EU legal
discourse, including that on EU private law, focuses on the duality of
social and economic human interests – the social human interests versus
the economic human interests. This chapter agrees with Kostakopou-
lou,11 Ferreira,12 and Kukovec13 that there is value in moving beyond this
dichotomy. In light of global power dynamics and wealth inequalities,
one person’s social interest is another person’s economic interest, and
vice versa. Assuming shared notions of ‘social interests’ when critiquing
the technocratic nature of EU integration is not without its consequences.
It may be argued that it leads to a bias, for example where the ‘social’
interest behind the free movement claim is not portrayed adequately, but
is, instead, politically obscured by its pre-classification as inherently
‘economic’.14
This chapter, therefore, cautiously embraces the intellectual move
towards a so-called ‘humane-based approach’ to EU law. It subscribes
to the argument put forth by Kostakopoulou that a humanistic axiology
11 See D Kostakopoulou’s chapter: ‘Towards a Humanistic Philosophy of the European
Union’, in this volume.
12 See N Ferreira’s chapter: ‘The Human Face of the European Union: Are EU Law and
Policy Humane Enough? An Introduction’, in this volume.
13 See D Kukovec, ‘Taking Change Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Reproduction
of the Status Quo’ in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice
Deficit? (Hart, 2015) 319–337.
14 See the critique of the Laval and Viking aftermath by Kukovec, ibid.
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may focus our critical awareness away from the economic paradigm of
the EU’s institutional design and policy efforts. Instead of critiquing the
‘justness’ of EU private law by identifying a preference for an economic
or social interest, the substantive outcome may be assessed vis-à-vis its
impact on ‘human flourishing’ (taking account of available empirical
evidence).15 Returning to the matter at hand, we can identify nine
interests core to ‘human flourishing’ that are relevant in the domain of
substantive private law: (1) life, (2) physical and mental integrity, (3)
health care, (4) private and family life, (5) freedom of thought, con-
science and religion, (6) freedom of expression and information, (7)
freedom of association, (8) equality and non-discrimination, and (9)
education. This list is non-exhaustive.
A complete assessment of the extent to which EU private law respects
and protects these nine interests would require writing an entire book.
Not even a summarial, overview-like analysis of the level of protection of
these nine interests in EU private law could be carried out within a
chapter of this length.16 Therefore, this chapter will first briefly discuss
the European fundamental rights/human rights dimension of the above-
mentioned nine interests, and then it will focus on only one of them:
health care. Before doing so, it is worth briefly explaining why a funda-
mental/human rights focus (notwithstanding its challenges) is relevant to
‘going about assessing humaneness’ in European private law and why
health care is an appropriate choice for a case study.
A fundamental/human rights focus is relevant to ‘going about assess-
ing humaneness’ in European private law for three reasons. Firstly, the
‘inner dimension’ of the universality of human rights (which incorpor-
ates both substantive aspects17 and functional aspects)18 is, arguably, a
15 See Kostakopoulou’s final chapter in this volume.
16 Each of these nine interests could be, and some have been indeed, the subject of a thick
book. See for example M Hunter-Hening (ed) Law, Religious Freedom and Education in
Europe (Ashgate, 2012); R Schulze (ed) Non-Discrimination in European Private Law
(Mohr, 2011); K Ziegler (ed) Human Rights and Private Law. Privacy as Autonomy (Hart
Publishing, 2007).
17 The ‘substantive’ aspects are as follows: human rights are inherent to all human beings;
human rights must be protected against all encroachments; the basic values such as
dignity, freedom and autonomy of an individual must be explicitly or implicitly pro-
tected. See: R Arnold, ‘Reflections on the Universality of Human Rights’ in R Arnold (ed),
The Universalism of Human Rights (Springer, 2013) 2.
18 The ‘functional’ aspects are as follows: necessary limitations must respect the principle of
optimalisation of human rights; intervention by public power must be founded on law, be
backed up by a legitimate reason, be necessary for the needs of the democratic society and
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type of ‘universalist humanism’.19 From this view, normative human
rights structures,20 which profess the central value and dignity of each
human being and the liberty and the equality of all human beings, are
built on a ‘humanist axiology’.21 As Ferry and Renaut insist: some form
of humanism is necessary for the preservation of human rights.22 Secondly,
there is an intellectual movement within legal thought towards human
rights in private law prompted by the need to have a unified legal order.23
Statements of fundamental rights and principles (stemming from
national constitutions, European or international treaties) may be seen
as serving as ‘the bedrock values of an entire legal order’.24 These values
infuse both public and private law.25 Thirdly, once European private law
is perceived as a regulatory instrument of private relationships designed
be the sole adequate means of achieving such a legitimate reason (principle of propor-
tionality); the core (the very nature, the essence) of human rights must not be affected;
and efficient judicial protection is indispensable. See Arnold, ibid.
19 See A Reis Monteiro, Ethics of Human Rights (Springer, 2014) 3–6.
20 I.e. the UN Covenants and specific human rights instruments on the regional level with
guarantee systems in America, in Africa, and – deemed as the most efficient and influen-
tial – in Europe with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
21 This axiology is, according to Kostakopoulou (final chapter in this volume), that: ‘struc-
tures and policies must contribute to creating, and bettering, the conditions for a more
fulfilled and dignified living’.
22 See the Foreword by Alexander Nehamas, in A Renaut, M B Debevoise, F Phillip, The Era
of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity (Princeton University Press,
2014).
23 A Barak, ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’, in D Friedmann and D Barak-
Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2001) 13, 21–22; J Smits,
‘Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A Sceptical View’, in T Barkhuysen and S
Lindenbergh (eds), Constitutionalization of Private Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 9.
24 H Collins, ‘The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe’ (2011) 13
University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper 1.
25 There is a growing amount of scholarship on the impact of fundamental rights on
national and European private law, see, amongst others: O Cherednychenko, ‘EU Funda-
mental Rights, EC Fundamental Freedoms and Private Law’ (2006) 1 European Review of
Private Law 23–61; A Colombi Ciacchi, ‘The Constitutionalization of European Contract
Law: Judicial Convergence and Social Justice’ (2006) European Review of Contract Law 2;
M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles
and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7(4) German Law Journal 341–370;
D Oliver and J Fedtke (eds), Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study
(Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); C Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law:
A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England (Kluwer Law International, 2008); G
Brüggemeier, A Colombi Ciacchi and G Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private
Law in the European Union. Volume 1: A Comparative Overview (Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
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to protect certain goals such as consumer protection or the internal
market, and in doing so, shaping certain public law objectives (such as
the provision of health care), then the relevance of human rights to
European private law is ‘brought to the fore’.26
The Introduction to this volume alludes to the inherent problem of
isolation in rights discourse, i.e. the failure to consider individuals’
contexts, communities and relationships.27 As stated above, we under-
stand the humane-based approach,28 outlined in the Introduction to this
volume, to be concomitant with the norms underlining a balanced
rights-based approach. In this respect, it is hard to see how a humane-
based approach (based on contested concepts of compassion, empathy,
caring, etc.) is better equipped to avoid the isolation problem. Moreover,
rights discourse has been subject to numerous more criticisms: it has
been said to be profoundly indeterminate,29 to distort the debate,30 to
be uncompromising,31 and to be simplistic.32 Arguably, these same
dangers face a loosely defined humane-based approach to law and policy
making.
Notwithstanding such criticisms, this chapter is premised on the
assumption that the notion of humaneness and the question of human
rights protection inevitably intertwine (or at least they cannot be clearly
normatively distinguished), and are of value in assessing substantive
policy outcomes (in the EU or otherwise). Yet, to be of real value, they
require careful contextualisation between the individual and the com-
munity, between freedoms and limitations. For example, a more bal-
anced non-isolated rights critique shows that the horizontal application
of fundamental rights in national legal systems mostly serve to coun-
terbalance excessive abuse of power (i.e. protect the weaker party) and
26 See H Collins (note 24 above) 2–3.
27 See N Ferreira’s introductory chapter in this volume, whereby it is stated that an abstract
human rights critique ‘without sufficiently considering individuals’ context, communities
and relationships [. . .] contributes to the dangers of pitting opposing rights, and there-
fore, individuals and entities against each other’.
28 This (areligious) ethical framework is informed by Western (feminist) ethics-of-care,
Confucian philosophy and African customary law.
29 See D Kennedy, ‘Critical Labour Law Theory: A Comment’ (1981) 4 Industrial Relations
Law Journal 506.
30 See L R Klass, ‘Is There a Right to Die?’ (1993) 23(1) Hastings Centre Report Journal 37.
31 See M A Glendon, Right Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (Free Press,
1993) 44.
32 Ibid, 15.
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to uphold democratic values impacted by private law relationships
(such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality between
men and women, etc.).33
In terms of justifying the case study of health care, the overarching
norms alluded to in the Introduction of this volume, jen and ubuntu,
possess another common thread beyond a shared humane-centred con-
cern: they both recognise the normative co-dependency between individ-
ual well-being and communal well-being.34 This co-dependency is
pertinently clear in the dual function of health care.35 A dual function
which is, as we will see later, also reflected in the different dimensions of
the fundamental/human right to health care at the European and inter-
national level (the libertarian dimension and the social solidarity dimen-
sion). On the one hand, there exists a need to provide for universal,
permanent and adequate access to medical demands that increase the
lifespan of individuals and that adds to their basic quality of life. On the
other hand, health care is a consumable good that reflects the significance
of individual control over one’s own body and mind; in this sense,
patients must be free to access health care structures that satisfy their
personal preference. A given policy on the provision of health care that
actualises this dual function as much as possible, is one striving to meet
the normative demands of jen and ubuntu. The question that hereby
arises is: what impact does EU private law have on the ability to meet
these normative demands?
2 Fundamental rights dimension of nine interests
core to ‘human flourishing’
The nine interests mentioned above will resonate with readers who have
some knowledge of human rights or constitutionally protected funda-
mental rights. One may ask whether and to what extent these interests
are acknowledged as European fundamental rights. As touched on above,
this question bears relevance also in the European private law context.
Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that fundamental rights in general, and
33 See A Colombi Ciacchi, ‘The Constitutionalization of European Contract Law: Judicial
Convergence and Contract Law’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 177.
34 See Ferreira’s introductory chapter in this volume.
35 See J Ruger, Health and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) 2–4. See also J
McHale, ‘Fundamental rights and health care’ in E Mossialos et al (eds) Health Systems
Governance in Europe – The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge
University Press, 2010) 283–294.
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European fundamental rights in particular, have both a vertical and a
horizontal effect on private law and private relationships. Vertically,
these rights create obligations for lawmakers, and horizontally, they
create obligations for courts and – to a certain extent – for private parties
directly.36
This chapter understands the concept of ‘European fundamental
rights’ as embracing the following types of rights:
• human rights, i.e. the rights enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) or other international treaties acknowledging
human rights, and the rights otherwise acknowledged as human rights
under international law;
• rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (CFREU, hereinafter also ‘the Charter’);37
• rights resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the EU
Member States; and
• rights otherwise generally acknowledged as fundamental in the EU
legal order.
This body of European fundamental rights is thus much older than the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In the 1960s–
1970s, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) introduced and progres-
sively developed the rule according to which the human rights enshrined
in international conventions binding upon the Member States of the EU
(then EC) and the fundamental rights resulting from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States are to be observed as general
principles of Community law.38 This rule became established
36 See amongst others G Brüggemeier, A Colombi Ciacchi and G Comandé (eds) Funda-
mental Rights and Private Law in the European Union (note 9 above); D Leczykiewicz,
‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights: In Search of Social Justice or Private Auton-
omy in EU Law?’, in U Bernitz, X Groussot and F Schulyok (eds), General Principles of
EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer Law International, 2013); M Safjan, ‘Reflec-
tions on the Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in EU Law – Limits of Direct
Influence of CJEU Decisions’ in K Purnhagen and P Rott (eds), Varieties of European
Economic Law and Regulation. Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz (Springer, 2014) 139
et seq.; A Colombi Ciacchi (note 8 above) 102 at 104 et seq., with further references.




38 See Case C-29/69, Stauder, [1969] ECR 1–419: ‘. . . the fundamental human rights
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court’;
ECJ Case C-4/73, Nold v European Commission, [1974] ECR 372: ‘. . . fundamental rights
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jurisprudence of the ECJ. It was then codified in the Maastricht Treaty
and maintained in all successive treaties.39
Therefore, the above body of European fundamental rights must be
respected by: (1) the EU institutions, agencies and bodies when making,
interpreting, and applying primary or secondary EU law in the field of
public or private law; and (2) the Member States when they are ‘imple-
menting EU law’ (see specifically Article 51 of the CFREU). In light of
CJEU case law, Cherednychenko succinctly (and correctly) states that
‘implementing EU law’ must be understood in a wide sense subsuming
‘all national public acts within the scope of EU law’.40 This has meant
that national public authorities are bound by European fundamental
rights not only in the process of transposing EU law, but also when they
derogate from EU legal provisions.41
Six of the above-mentioned nine interests find explicit recognition
both as human rights in the ECHR and as EU fundamental rights in
the Charter: the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR and Art. 2 CFREU), the right
to private and family life (Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 7 CFREU), freedom of
thought, conscience and religion (Art. 9 ECHR and Art. 10 CFREU),
form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which [the Court]
ensures. In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from
constitutional tradition common to the Member States. [. . .] Similarly, international
Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collabor-
ated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed
within the framework of community law’.
39 With the introduction of Art F (now. Article 6 TEU). For general reading on human
rights/fundamental rights in the EU see: S De Vries, U Bernitz and S Weatherill, The
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon (Hart Publishing, 2013); P
Alston, J Heenan and M Bustelo (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University
Press, 1999); A Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford University
Press, 2004); O De Schutter and I Butler, ‘Binding the EU to International Human Rights
Law (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law 277.
40 O Cherednychenko (note 5 above) 173. This viewpoint was confirmed in a recent
CJEU decision, see: Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECR
I-0000.
41 See for example: Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Home Secretary [2002] ECR I-6279; Case
C-109/01 Home Secretary v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607; Case C-441/02 Commission v
Germany [2006] ECR I-3449; Case C-145/09 Land BadenWürtemberg v Tsakouridis
[2010] ECR I-11979; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v ONEM [2011] ECR I-1177. Less
controversially, the CJEU has also held that the protection of fundamental/human
rights in itself constitutes a legitimate interest which will justify a restriction on EU
law, see: Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609; Case C-112/00 Schmid-
berger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659; Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECR
I-13693.
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freedom of expression and information (Art. 10 ECHR and Art. 11
CFREU), freedom of association (Art. 11 ECHR and Art. 12 CFREU),
and non-discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 21 CFREU).
The remaining three interests (physical and mental integrity, health
and education) are not expressly mentioned in the ECHR, whilst the
Charter explicitly codifies them as EU fundamental rights. The first Title
of the Charter (‘Dignity’) enshrines the right to physical and mental
integrity (Art. 3 CFREU)42 among the most fundamental of all rights,
placing it immediately after the right to human dignity and the right to
life. The right to education (Art. 14 CFREU)43 can be found in the second
Title of the Charter (‘Freedoms’). Again a different section of the Charter,
Title III (‘Solidarity’), enshrines the right to health care (Art. 35
CFREU).44
3 Two different fundamental rights relating to
health care interests
Without physical and mental integrity, one cannot be a healthy
human being. If the interest in one’s health is logically connected to
the interest in one’s physical and mental integrity, why has the Charter
codified these two interests so far from each other – the right to
physical and mental integrity under the heading ‘Dignity’ and the
right to health care under the heading ‘Solidarity’? Why do the right
42 Which reads: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental
integrity; 2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in
particular: the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the
procedures laid down by law, the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those
aiming at the selection of persons, the prohibition on making the human body and its
parts as such a source of financial gain, the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of
human beings’.
43 Which reads: ‘Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and
continuing training. 2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory
education. 3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for
democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of
their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convic-
tions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of
such freedom and right’.
44 Which reads: ‘Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to
benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and
practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Union policies and activities’.
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to physical and mental integrity on the one hand, and the right to
health care on the other, appear as two remarkably different rights in
the system of European fundamental rights?
A first answer to this question can be found in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). According to this Court’s
established jurisprudence, the protection of private life under Article
8 ECHR encompasses a person’s physical and psychological integrity.45
Measures affecting the physical or psychological integrity have to reach a
certain degree of severity to qualify as an interference with the right to
private life under Article 8 ECHR.46 Nonetheless, even minor interfer-
ences with a person’s physical integrity (for example a gynaecological
examination47) may fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR if they are
against the person’s will.48
As shaped by the ECtHR’s case law, the right to physical or psycho-
logical integrity is a liberty right, which corresponds to the negative
obligations not to cause bodily or mental injuries to others, and not to
administer medical treatment without the patient’s consent. The content
of this right is substantially different from the social right to health,
which entails the positive obligations of providing adequate health care.49
This explains why the Charter codified the liberty right to physical or
psychological integrity in Article 3, and the social right to health care in
Article 35.
The qualification of the basic interest in health care as a human right50
is controverted, at least outside Europe.51 At the international level,
health care finds recognition in the framework of the socio-economic
45 ECtHR Y.F. v Turkey (application no. 24209/94) 22 July 2003; ECtHR Bensaid v UK
(application no. 44599/98) 6 February 2001, 6 May 2001 final, para 47.
46 Bensaid v UK, ibid, para 46. 47 This was the case in Y.F. v Turkey (note 45 above).
48 ECtHR Storck v Germany (application no. 61603/00) 6 June 2005, para 143. Confer
http://echr-online.info/physical-integrity/.
49 For critiques arguing that the distinction between positive and negative human rights
obligations should be abandoned, see: G de Becco, Non-judicial Mechanisms for the
Implementation of Human Rights in European States (Bruylant, 2010) 24; O De Schutter,
Fonction de juger et droits fondamentaux. Transformation du contróle juridictionnel dans
les orders juridiques américain et européens (Bruylant, 1999) 141–143.
50 On health as a human right see among others B Toebes, ‘Health, Human Rights and
Social Justice in Europe’ in I Lintel, A Buyse and L McGoingle (eds.), Defending Human
Rights: Tools for Social Justice (Intersentia, 2013) 109–125.
51 Some neo-liberal American thinkers refuse to acknowledge a human right to health care.
See GE Vidal, ‘Healthcare is Not a Human Right’, The Libertarian Standard, http://
libertarianstandard.com/articles/gabriel-e-vidal/healthcare-is-not-a-human-right/.
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rights, or human rights of second generation.52 It is explicitly enshrined
in Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),53 and implicitly embraced by the human right
to an adequate standard of living under Article 25(1) of the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).54
One may therefore conclude that at both the international and the EU
level, the fundamental right to health presents two dimensions: a liber-
tarian one, corresponding to the obligation not to interfere with some-
one’s physical and psychological integrity, and a dimension of social
solidarity, corresponding to the obligation to ensure a high level of
human health protection.
4 Is European private Law humane enough from
the viewpoint of health protection?
4.1 Preliminary remarks
Article 35 CFREU states: ‘Everyone has the right of access to preventive
health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the
conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and imple-
mentation of all the Union’s policies and activities’.
One question that arises is whether European private law adequately
respects the social solidarity dimension of the fundamental right to
health care. Considering that some conceptualisation of humanism is
52 The first known mention of different generations of human rights goes back to K Vasak,
‘A 30-Year Struggle’, The UNESCO Courier (November 1977) 29; confer also K Vasak
(ed), The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Greenwood Press, 1982). For
extensive discussion on, and examples of human rights of first, second and third
generations, see C Tomuschat, Human Rights Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford
University Press, 2003) 24 et seq. Sometimes the three generations of rights are delineated
by a colour scheme as ‘blue’, ‘red’ and ‘green’ rights: J Galtung, Human Rights in Another
Key (Oxford: Polity, 1994) 151 et seq. For a brilliant critique from a ‘colour blind’
viewpoint U Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002) 70.
53 This Article acknowledges ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health’, and obliges the States Parties to take
the steps necessary to achieve the full realisation of this right, including ‘the creation of
conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of
sickness’.
54 ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services [. . .]’.
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a requisite component of the inner dimension55 of universal fundamen-
tal/human rights, this line of inquiry may go some way to assessing
whether European private law is ‘humane’ enough from the viewpoint
of health protection. The answer to this question can be split into four
parts. The first part (see Section 4.2) addresses the relevant CJEU judg-
ments on cross-border health care and the Patient Rights Directive. The
second part (see Section 4.3) deals with the consumer law Directives
applicable also to health-related contractual relationships. The third part
(see Section 4.4) considers the EU legislation on safety standards for
products, food, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. The fourth part
(see Section 4.5) discusses the possible impact of the full harmonisation
under the Product Liability Directive on the level of health protection.
4.2 The CJEU case law on cross-border healthcare and
the Patient Rights Directive
Some scholars perceive EU law in general, and EU free movement law in
particular, as a threat to national health care standards. For example,
according to Hervey, the institutional structures that support law and
policy-making at EU level are often unsupportive of, or even unaware of,
health care concerns.56 Such claims seem, however, to be based more on
the general assumption that EU free movement law might weaken the
national welfare systems, than on a specific analysis of how each relevant
EU law instrument affects the level of human health protection.
55 As alluded to in Section 1 above, a loose baseline ‘humanist perspective’ (see Kostako-
poulou’s chapter in this volume, where certain core elements may be discerned from the
various schools of humanism) is a perspective, at least as we understand it, normatively at
the heart of the established substantive and functional aspects of universal human rights.
Kostakopoulou discerns core elements of humanism as ‘(i) the significance given to the
Latin term humanus (human) which is, in turn, derived from the noun ‘homo’ which
means human being, ii) the belief that the social realities and institutional structures that
house and bind human beings must be fit for human living and iii) that there is an
explicit, or implicit, expectation that some form of ‘anthropoplassy’ is both possible and
desirable’. Compare this perspective on humanism with the perspective on human rights
alluded to by Reis Monteiro (note 19 above).
56 T Hervey, ‘The Impacts of European Union Law on the Health Care Sector: Institutional
Overview’ (2010) 16 Eurohealth 5. The author stresses the ‘clash of logic’ between internal
market law and the solidarity model of the national healthcare systems, organised
through the exclusion of those outside the nation state concerned. See also T Hervey
and L Trubek, ‘Freedom to Provide Healthcare Services in the EU: An Opportunity for
“Hybrid Governance”’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 623.
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In the cases Kohll,57 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms,58 Muller-Fauré
and Van Riet,59 Inzian,60 Watts,61 and Elchinov,62 patients unsatisfied
with the health care provided in their country of residence (an EU
Member State) sought better, or earlier, medical treatment in another
Member State and claimed the reimbursement of such treatment in
their country of residence. In all the above-mentioned cases, the CJEU
supported this patient mobility.63 Given the broad definition of Euro-
pean private law set out in the introduction of this chapter, these cases
cannot be understood as strictly public law matters. The public law
relationship between the individual and the state of affiliation (con-
cerning the entitlement to reimbursement of expenses from the public
purse) happened to arise out of an a priori private law relationship (the
existence of a cross-border agreement between a patient and a private
health care provider). From this perspective, these cross-border health
care cases evidence Böhm’s concept of the private law society – public
power was constrained by the supremacy of private law arrangements.
The public power to limit reimbursement in such cases was subject to
the rationale of EU rules64 and the CJEU’s interpretation of these rules.
Now a question arises: how does this CJEU jurisprudence affect the
level of health protection offered to EU citizens? To help us answer this
57 C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931.
58 C-157/99 Gereats-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473.
59 C-385/99 Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509. For a comment of this
judgment see G Davies ‘Health and Efficiency: Community Law and National Health
Systems in the Light of Müller-Fauré’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 94.
60 C-56/01 Inzian [2003] ECR I-12403.
61 C-327/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para 75. For a comment of this judgment see
G Davies ‘The effect of Mrs Watts’ trip to France on the National Health Service’
(2007) King’s Law Journal 158.
62 C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I-08889.
63 See W Sauter, ‘Harmonisation in healthcare: the EU patient rights’ Directive’ (2011)
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011–030, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1859251, 4.
64 These rules are EU Treaty provisions, namely Article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide
services, and also secondary EU legislation aimed to facilitate the free movement of
workers and self-employed persons, along with family members who accompany them,
namely Regulation 1408/71, which was adopted to further the free movement of these
persons within the Union by coordinating aspects of national social security systems. This
regulation was superseded in 2004 by Regulation 883/2004 (coming into effect in 2010),
which expanded the coverage of these rules to cover all persons lawfully resident in a
Member State of affiliation.
fundamental rights and humaneness 117
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924795.006
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 13 Mar 2017 at 14:22:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
question, we will reflect on particular studies carried out by Davies,65
Kaczorowska,66 and de Witte.67
First and foremost, we may say that in the aforementioned CJEU
jurisprudence, the health care needs specific to the individual played a
key role. The Court ruled that any restriction on the patient’s contractual
freedom to receive a medical service, such as the conditions on prior
authorisation for reimbursement, must take into account the medical
needs of the individual concerned.
In Watts and Elchinov, the Court used the fundamental freedoms and
the relevant secondary legislation to compensate for the inadequacies/
failures of national health systems and entitle the patient to seek the
required treatment abroad.68 Davies69 addressed the clash between the
patient-centred, needs-based approach of the CJEU,70 and the logic of the
national healthcare systems, in particular the one underlying the UK
National Health Service (NHS). He rightfully pointed out that the Watts
decision only affects the national healthcare systems insofar as they are
unable to provide treatment without undue delay. If the national systems
offered operations within a time corresponding to patients’ medical
needs, such decisions of the CJEU would have no effect.71 In the Watts
case, the UK government argued that the effect of the CJEU’s patient-
centred, needs-based approach to provision of health care would be to
undermine the national authorities’ capacity to manage the system via
the use of waiting lists.72 Davies commented sharply: ‘Was the UK
government really arguing for its right to act against the medical interests
of patients waiting for treatment? It was, but it lost the point, and it can
do so no longer’.73 The demand for ‘undue delay’ and ‘effective treat-
ment’ have granted the individual a right to adequate care whenever a
65 G Davies (note 59 above) 94; id (note 61 above) 158.
66 A Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right
to Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 European Law
Journal 345.
67 F de Witte, EU law and the question of justice (PhD thesis, London School of Economics,
2012), available at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/452/. Forthcoming in published format as: F de
Witte, Justice in the EU – The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (Oxford University
Press 2015).
68 Ibid, 746. 69 G Davies (note 59 above) 94; id (note 61 above) 158.
70 G Davies (note 61 above) 160. 71 G Davies (note 61 above) 166.
72 C-327/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para 75. For a comment of this judgment see
G Davies (note 54 above) 158.
73 G Davies (note 61 above) 161.
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treatment option can be construed to fall within the ‘basket of health
care’ in the state of affiliation but cannot be provided in its territory.
Kaczorowska convincingly demonstrated that the Court, by creating a
new right to effective and speedy medical treatment, has to a certain
extent attained the main objective of Article 35 of the CFREU. It is
regrettable that this Article was not explicitly relied on by the Court.
Nonetheless, this new right to effective and speedy medical treatment
tangibly protects the EU citizens, who will neither have to wait indefin-
itely to obtain medical treatment, nor have to accept substandard treat-
ment in their Member State of insurance.74
It is also worth noting that the unmet need of health care in the
state of affiliation arises only in exceptional circumstances. A number
of sources suggest that this unmet need, particularly related to the
costs or the availability of specific medical treatment, is limited within
the EU.75 Furthermore, there is evidence that this line of case law has
managed to partially help Member States meet their positive obligation
(i.e. provide for basic health care). Empirical research shows that
Member States have used the same rationale behind the Watts and
Elchinov decisions to compensate for the lack of financial and techno-
logical resources required to treat rare diseases,76 or to balance
74 A Kaczorowska (note 66 above) 345.
75 See S Allen and C Masseria, ‘Research Note: Unmet need as an indicator of access
to health care in Europe’, European Commission, Directorate-General ‘Employment,
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities’, Unit E1 – Social and Demographic Analysis
(December 2009); See Table 8.1, Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on
Cross-Border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, 68. Note that more recent research found,
somewhat expectedly, that the global financial crisis has increased the unmet need of
health care in certain ‘crisis’ EU Member States (namely in Greece, Italy, and Latvia).
However, ‘this increase has often been less severe for those groups that previously
reported higher-than-average enforced unmet need’ in said countries. Also, the preva-
lence of enforced unmet health care has remained ‘relatively low’ in other ‘crisis’Member
States – 2% in Ireland and Portugal, 1% in Spain and 0.5% in Slovenia. See: European
Commission Research note 7/2013, ‘The impact of the financial crisis on unmet needs for
healthcare’ (November 2013).
76 See De Witte (note 67 above) 95: ‘Malta and Luxemburg, for example, simply outsource
treatment of such patients to other systems, which frees up resources for other treat-
ments. Likewise, it allows less rich Member States to offer treatment options that are (for
the moment) unavailable at home’. See also Opinion of AG Villalón in Elchinov [2010],
para. 72: ‘a system such as the Bulgarian system, which seeks to offer a very advanced list
of treatment that is paid for by the fund, benefits from the knowledge and technology of
other Member States which have the technical resources to which Bulgaria aspires. If a
Member State wishes to be at the cutting edge of medical treatment (which naturally takes
time), European Union law allows its citizens to receive in another Member State
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negative externalities between the supply and demand of health care at
the border regions.77
As for the decisions in Kohll and Muller-Fauré concerning the receipt
of medical services as an expression of patient choice, national govern-
ments brought forward two general arguments premised upon their
positive obligation to protect immobile citizens. One argument is based
on the infrastructural stability of the health care system of affiliation,
while the other relates to the financial stability of the said system.
The infrastructural argument assumes that increased patient mobility
will result in a waste of resources and cutbacks in cost-intensive treat-
ments, leaving ‘immobile’ patients in the state of affiliation worse off.78
This is a legitimate concern, but in order to be a justified exception to free
movement rules, it must be objectively and empirically demonstrated.
Indeed, this may be difficult, but a fair assessment can be based on the
number of mobile patients. The Commission recently estimated that 1%
of the total Gross Domestic Product of the EU is spent on cross-border
health care (most of which is spent on emergency care and not planned
care),79 as the number of cross-border patients remains extremely low. In
context, approximately EUR 9.7 billion of a total EUR 12,149 billion is
spent on such health care.80
treatment which the former State wishes to make available domestically, although not at
present in a position to do so’.
77 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008)
2163, p. 42: ‘Belgium has had larger patient flows for planned care thanmost otherMember
States, in particular with Dutch patients being treated in Flanders through contracts
between Dutch health insurers and Belgian providers. In this case study, the researchers
consider that as well as being convenient for patients, this is more efficient for both the
Dutch insurers (providing care that is faster and cheaper, as well as being perceived as
technologically advanced and of high quality) and the Belgian providers (helping to
overcome overcapacity in the acute hospital sector by treating patients from abroad)’.
78 See F de Witte (note 67 above) 97–98.
79 See European Commission, ‘Memo on Q&A: Patients’ Rights in Cross-border Healthcare’
(2013), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-918_en.htm. See
also Commission Impact Assessment (note 77 above) 9.
80 In a national context, between 2001 and 2006, the United Kingdom spent approximately
GBP 2 billion on cross-border health care, while during that same period it spent an
estimated GBP 4 billion on overpaid benefits due to official mistakes. See E Van Ginneken
and R Busse, ‘Cross-Border Health Care Data’, in M. Wissmaer, W. Palm et al. (eds),
Cross-Border Health Care in the EU: Mapping and Analyzing Practices and Policies,
Observatory Studies Series (2008) 310; and see annual rates regarding Estimates of Fraud
and Error Levels in the Benefit System in Great Britain, National Statistics by the
Department of Work and Pensions, UK government publications. See www.gov.uk/
government/publications.
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The second argument regarding financial stability assumes that patient
mobility will destabilise access to adequate treatment for all citizens by
producing financial asymmetries. Firstly, this argument is conceptually
flawed. The Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that in the case
of patients who choose treatment abroad, the Member State of affiliation
is only required to reimburse costs up to the same amount it would have,
had the treatment taken place in its territory. Any costs above this
threshold are borne by the patient. Thus, as the patient contributes to
the funding of the collective insurance scheme and becomes a beneficiary
of that scheme at no extra cost, there can be no logical reasoning to
assume that the financial stability of the health care system is suddenly
under threat. Secondly, there is no empirical evidence as of yet that the
financial stability of national distributive choices has been negatively
affected. National actors argue that financial instability may be difficult
to prove until it is too late; they fear a drop may become a flood.
Nonetheless, as it stands, there exists empirical evidence to the contrary –
the number of cross-border patients is extremely low and moderate
estimates suggest that patient mobility is financially advantageous for
the Member States.81 This goes some way to explaining the difficulty in
identifying the adverse effects repeatedly warned by such national actors.
Indeed, a drop may become a flood in the future, but without signs of
becoming even a stream, such arguments appear nothing more than
hyped speculation.
Essentially, EU private law, vis-à-vis the fundamental freedoms, has
protected the right to receive adequate health care free from unjusti-
fiable restrictions, without so far disrupting (evidence actually shows it
is marginally aiding) the positive obligation to ensure a universally
accessible health system. This means that it cannot be said that either
the libertarian or social solidarity dimension of the fundamental right
to health care have been undermined. Note that the Court has also
refrained from imposing any positive obligations upon the Member
States. National policymakers retain the regulatory autonomy to decide
whether or not to reimburse particular costs for treatment or under
what conditions reimbursement is possible.82 Yet, if they decide to offer
reimbursement for certain treatment within the state of affiliation, they
81 See Commission Impact Assessment (note 77 above) 34, 55.
82 Aside from the Muller-Faure decision on this, see Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007]
ECR I-3185, para 26 and 38.
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cannot deny reimbursement should that treatment be provided outside
the state of affiliation.83
The same arguments that defend the Court’s jurisprudence on cross-
border healthcare also defend the Patient Rights Directive,84 which to a
large extent codifies this jurisprudence.85 This Directive is, however, less
intrusive in the functioning of the national healthcare systems than the
CJEU rulings preceding it.86 According to Hatzopoulous and Hervey,
the CJEU’s ‘revolution is over’ as the baton has been picked up by the
political institutions at the EU and Member State level.87 Agreement is
had here with Cohen, that time (and the manner in which Member States
actually implement the Directive) will tell how much judicial restraint we
may expect to see from the CJEU in the coming years.88
In terms of any added benefit of the Directive, there are a number of
advantages for the patient89 (at least in theory, again, much hinges on its
actual implementation by Member States). Firstly, it requires the estab-
lishment of national contact points providing patients with relevant
information to help ‘make an informed choice, including on treatment
options, on the availability, quality, and safety of the healthcare’ provided
in the Member state of treatment, as well as ‘clear information on prices
[. . .] and insurance cover’.90 The Directive, however, does not make any
stipulation for this information to be legally provided in various EU
languages. This means patients who cannot speak the official language
of the Member State of treatment may find this information inaccessible.
Secondly, patients must be made aware of the legal route via EU Regulation
83 Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, para. 48.
84 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
85 The Commission’s primary justification for proposing the Patient Rights Directive was
the Member States’ failure to properly implement the Court’s case law on cross-border
healthcare. See W Sauter (note 63 above) 4. For a discussion on the main components
of the Patient Rights Directive – prior authorisation, reimbursement, patient rights and
cooperation – in light of the CJEU’s case law, see also G Cohen, Patients with Passports:
Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2014) 186–198.
86 This is demonstrated by V Hatzopoulos and T Hervey, ‘Coming into line: The EU’s court
softens on cross-border healthcare’ (2012) Health Economics Policy and Law 1.
87 Ibid, 5. 88 See Cohen (note 85 above) 198.
89 See M Peeters, ‘Free Movement of Patients: Directive 2011/24 on the Application of
Patients’ Rights in Cross-border Healthcare’ (2012) 19 European Journal of Health Law
29, 51; see also P Quinn and P de Hert, ‘The European Patients’ Rights Directive:
A Clarification and Codification of Individual Rights Relating to Cross Border Healthcare
and Novel Initiatives Aimed at Improve Pan-European Healthcare Cooperation’ (2012)
12(1) Medical Law International 1, 37.
90 Directive 2011/24/EU, Article 4(2)(b).
122 aurelia colombi ciacchi and adam mccann
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924795.006
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 13 Mar 2017 at 14:22:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
1408/71, i.e. the E112 form, if and when they make inquiries to the
national contact points about planned care abroad.91 The Regulation
route may be more beneficial in many circumstances, for example, when
up-front payment by the patient for the treatment is not required.92
Thirdly, the Member State of affiliation must abide by data privacy,93 set
out a risk appropriate system of professional liability insurance94 and
ensure that for individuals who seek treatment in another Member State,
if ‘medical follow-up [care] proves necessary, the same medical follow-
up is available as would have been if that healthcare had been provided
on its territory’.95
4.3 The consumer law directives applicable to
health-related contracts
Patients can be seen as a particular category of consumers. The Unfair
Terms Directive96 and the Consumer Sales Directive97 apply also to
contracts for the purchase of health-related products or services con-
cluded between a consumer and a business (physician, hospital, phar-
macy, health insurer, etc. as private actors). These Directives have
considerably raised the standard of protection of consumers in all
Member States. This also implies that, thanks to EU law, patients in
healthcare related private contracts now enjoy a higher standard of
protection compared with the years previous to the enactment of the
EU Directives in the field of consumer contract law. The targeted full
91 Ibid, Article 5(b).
92 As Palm and Glinos state: ‘patients using the well-defined procedures of Article 22 of
Regulation 1408/71/EEC are better ensured that eventually their health care costs will be
covered; they do not need to advance payment, as they can benefit from the third party
payer system in place in the country of treatment; they have better guarantees that the
level of coverage will match more closely the tariff charged by the treating provider and,
in some cases, they can be covered for services that are not even included in the benefit
basket of their country of affiliation’ See W Palm and I A Glinos, ‘Enabling Patient
Mobility in the EU: Between Free Movement and Coordination’, in: E Mossialos et al
(eds) Health Systems Governance in Europe – The Role of European Union Law and Policy
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 516.
93 Directive 2011/24/EU, Article 4(2)(b). 94 Ibid, Article 4(2)(d).
95 Ibid, Article 5(c).
96 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ
L 095, 21/04/1993 p. 29.
97 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 07/07/
1999 p. 12.
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harmonisation approach introduced by the Consumer Rights Directive98
does not extend to contracts related to healthcare and social services
(including long-term care): these contracts remain outside of the scope of
the Directive,99 even in cases in which the healthcare provider is a private
actor.100
4.4 The EU legislation on safety standards for products, food,
pharmaceuticals, and medical devices
The standards of protection of consumers and patients have been
enhanced by a large body of EU secondary law concerning the quality
and safety standards that products have to comply with in order to be
lawfully traded on the EU market. These EU law measures, albeit primar-
ily concerning public law, bear a relevance also for private law because
they contribute to the regulation of contractual relationships, including
health-related contracts. As explained in the Introduction above, this
chapter shares Cherednychenko’s understanding of ‘European private
law’ as comprising all legal rules regulating relationships between private
parties regardless of the nature of the law, public or private, in which they
have been included in national legal systems.101 The Directives and
Regulations on product safety,102 food safety,103 pharmaceuticals,104 and
medical devices105 form a part of EU private law insofar as they contribute
to determine the content, effects and limits of validity of contracts for
these products and services in the EU. These EU law instruments have
introduced and increasingly improved a sophisticated system of controls,
98 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/
44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ
L 304, 22/11/2011 p. 64.
99 See Article 3(3) (a) and (b) of the Consumer Rights Directive.
100 Article 3(b) of the Consumer Rights Directive excludes from the scope of application of
the Directive ‘all contracts for healthcare as defined in point (a) of Article 3 of Directive
2011/24/EU, whether or not they are provided via healthcare facilities’.
101 See O Cherednychenko (note 5 above).
102 For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers_safety/product_safety_
legislation/index_en.htm.
103 For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/index_en.htm.
104 For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/eudralex/vol-1/index_en
.htm#reg.
105 For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/medical-devices/regulatory-
framework/index_en.htm.
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which has certainly enhanced the level of health protection throughout
the EU. For example, the numerous Directives and Regulations on
pharmaceuticals (Directive 65/65 EEC,106 Directive 75/318 EEC,107 Dir-
ective 75/319 EEC,108 Directive 93/41 EEC,109 Regulation 141/2000,110
Directive 2001/20 EC,111 Directive 2001/83 EC,112 Regulation 726/
2004,113 Directive 2005/28 EC,114 Regulation 1901/2006,115 Regulation
106 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid
down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal
products, OJ 022, 09/02/1965 p. 369.
107 Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of
Member States relating to analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and
protocols in respect of the testing of proprietary medicinal products, OJ L 147, 09/06/
1975 p. 1.
108 Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of provi-
sions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary
medicinal products, OJ L 147, 9/06/1975 p. 13.
109 Council Directive 93/41/EEC of 14 June 1993 repealing Directive 87/22/EEC on the
approximation of national measures relating to the placing on the market of high-
technology medicinal products, particularly those derived from biotechnology, OJ
L 214, 24/08/1993 p. 40.
110 Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (Consolidated version: 07/08/2009).
111 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001on
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical
trials on medicinal products for human use, OJ L 121, 1/5/2001 p. 34. On 16 April 2014,
this Directive was repealed by the Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products
for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC.
112 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November
2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311,
28/11/2001 p. 67. This Directive was amended several times. See the consolidated
version of 16/11/2012 at http://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/eudralex/vol-1/index_en
.htm.
113 Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervi-
sion of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European
Medicines Agency (Consolidated version: 05/06/2013).
114 Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council
laying down principles and detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards
investigational medicinal products for human use, as well as the requirements for
authorisation of the manufacturing or importation of such products, OJ L 91, 9/4/
2005 p. 13.
115 Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and amending Regulation
(EEC) No 1768/92, Directive 2001/20/EC, Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC)
No 726/2004 (consolidated version: 26/01/2007)
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1394/2007,116 Directive 2009/35/EC,117 Directive 2009/41/EC118) have
helped prevent mass health damages related to the use of pharmaceut-
icals. In fact, the first Pharmaceuticals Directive (65/65 EEC)119 was
enacted as a reaction to the Thalidomide scandal occurred in the early
1960s, before EU pharmaceuticals law came into existence.120
One may argue that the longer the history of EU legislative interven-
tion, the higher the number of Directives and Regulations in a certain
sector, and the tighter the system of controls, the smaller the risks
for public health in this sector. It is noteworthy, here, that the defective
breast implant scandal of 2010121 occurred in a sector where EU
regulation was and is still scarce, and the system of controls was
underdeveloped.122
116 Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive
2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (Consolidated version: 02/07/2012).
117 Directive 2009/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the colouring matters which may be added to medicinal products (recast), OJ L 109,
30/4/2009 p. 10.
118 Directive 2009/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on
the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (Recast), OJ L 125, 21/5/2009
p. 75.
119 See note 48 above.
120 See A Saint-Raymond and A J Humphreys, ‘Human Medicinals Products in the Euro-
pean Union: Regulations, Directives and Structures’ in J P Griffin, J Posner, G R Barker
(eds), The Textbook of Pharmaceutical Medicine (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
121 Also known as PIP scandal, since Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) was the name of the
French company that used industrial-grade silicone for the production of breast
implants instead of the mandated medical-grade silicone. On this case see S Singh,
‘Private Regulation in the Medical Devices Sector: Muddling through Administrative
Constitutionalism to Improve the Quality and Safety of Medical Devices on the Euro-
pean Market’, in A Colombi Ciacchi, M Heldeweg, B van der Meulen and R Neerhof
(eds), Law and Governance: Beyond the Public–Private Law Divide (Eleven International
Publishing, 2013), 185 et seq. For a recent analysis of the liability law aspects of this
scandal, see C Glinski and P Rott, ‘Die Haftung der Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsi-
cherheitsrecht’ (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZeuP) 192 et seq., with
further references. From a UK perspective see House of Commons, Science and Tech-
nology Committee, Regulation of Medical Implants in the EU and UK, Fifth Report of
Session 2012/2013, 5 et seq.
122 Only three Directives on medical devices exist: Directive 90/385/EEC, Directive 93/
42/EEC, and Directive 98/79/EC. In reaction to the PIP scandal, the EU took
immediate action to tighten controls on medical devices. See http://ec.europa.eu/
growth/sectors/medical-devices/pip/index_en.htm; J Whalen, ‘Medical Devices Face
Tighter Rules in EU’, Wall Street Journal, 22 October 2013, www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303672404579151781036297124.
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4.5 The Product Liability Directive
The only EU private law instrument that could raise some doubt from
the viewpoint of health protection and the humaneness of EU law and
policy in this field is the Product Liability Directive.123 Since this Direct-
ive is generally understood as a full harmonisation instrument, it pre-
cludes Member States from introducing higher product liability
standards at the national level. But could it be argued that this has an
adverse impact on health protection standards? We are not convinced
that it has. Firstly, the standards of protection set by the Product Liability
Directive are reasonably high. Secondly, the EU Regulations on product
safety, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices mentioned in the previous
section contain a large set of mandatory rules which secure a very high
standard of health protection. These mandatory standards for healthcare
related products and services arguably sufficiently counterbalance the
risk of a lowering of the product liability standards in some Member
States as a consequence of the full harmonisation under the Product
Liability Directive. Thirdly, in the European Union, the health protection
standards luckily do not depend primarily from the amounts of money
that victims of torts or defective products can recover under tort liability
from the private party responsible for the defect. If a health damage
arising from a defective product sold by a private party cannot be
compensated via tort liability, the economic burden of restoring the
victim’s health will fall back on the national health care system. The full
harmonisation under the Product Liability Directive does not have any
impact on the quality of the health care provided by the national health
care systems. Therefore, the Product Liability Directive cannot constitute
a danger for the humaneness of EU private law with regard to the
fundamental right to health.
5 Conclusion
An institution has a ‘human face’ if it takes basic human interests
seriously. This chapter has addressed the question of whether and how
these interests find proper consideration in EU private law. We identified
nine core interests for ‘human flourishing’ that are relevant in substantive
123 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective products, OJ L 210, 7/8/1985 p. 29.
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private law, and discussed their fundamental rights dimension. We then
focused on one of these basic human interests protected as an EU
fundamental right; namely, health care. We assessed the role played by
this fundamental right in EU legislation and CJEU jurisprudence in the
field of private law. In the light of this discussion, we would like to make
four concluding remarks, which are as follows:
(1) The jurisprudence of the CJEU on cross-border healthcare and the
Patient Rights Directive have created a new right to effective and
speedy medical treatment. This right ensures that EU citizens will
neither have to wait indefinitely to obtain medical treatment nor
have to accept substandard treatment in their Member State of
residence. The creation of this new right has, to a significant extent,
attained the main objective of Article 35 of the Charter.124 This new
right does not appear to have any adverse effect on the good func-
tioning of national health care systems. On the contrary, EU law
seems to provide – also in the context of private, health care related
contractual relations – a better protection of the individual right to
receive adequate healthcare free from unjustifiable restrictions, with-
out so far disrupting the positive obligation to ensure a universally
accessible health system.125 However, moving away from the core
substantive outcomes of the above case law, certain issues arise.
Firstly, the Court chose not to extrapolate the right to adequate
and effective health care from Article 21 TFEU (as a citizenship
based right) and Article 35 CFREU (as the right to access health
care).126 The complex and consistent couching of this right to health
care in primary and secondary law facilitating the free movement of
services and workers, respectively, means the Court has somewhat
blurred its humane-focused achievement in health care. Secondly, if
we are taking ‘humaneness’ in health care seriously, we cannot ignore
the reality of the individual’s treatment context. Evidence shows that
cross-border health care is an unwanted option for many
patients127 – it is treatment away from their home, perhaps in a
language they do not understand and with unfamiliar procedures.
124 A Kaczorowska (note 66 above) 345. 125 A McCann (note 10 above).
126 As alluded to by De Witte (note 67 above) 87.
127 H Legido-Quigley, I A Glinos, R Baeten et al., ‘Analysing Arrangements for Cross-
Border Mobility of Patients in the European Union: A Proposal for a Framework’ (2012)
108 Health Policy 27–36.
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Nonetheless for those patients who are provided with an advan-
tage,128 it is a crucial tool for better quality care, more specialised
care, or types of care otherwise unavailable.
(2) Patients can be seen as a particular category of consumers. The
Unfair Terms Directive and the Consumer Sales Directive have
considerably raised the standard of protection of these consumers
in all Member States for what concerns contracts concluded between
them and professional physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, health
insurers, etc. The targeted full harmonisation approach introduced
by the Consumer Rights Directive does not change anything in this
field because the contracts related to healthcare and social services
(including long-term care) remain outside of the scope of the
Directive.
(3) The standards of protection of consumers and patients have been
also enhanced by a large body of EU secondary law concerning the
quality and safety standards that products have to comply with in
order to be lawfully traded on the EU market. This body of law forms
a part of EU private law insofar as it also regulates private relation-
ships, in particular by contributing to determine the content, effects
and limits of validity of contracts for healthcare related services in
the EU. The increasingly tight controls provided by this body of EU
law increasingly reduce the public health risks.
(4) The full harmonisation under the Product Liability Directive argu-
ably does not have any substantial impact on the quality of the health
care provided by the national health care systems.
From the above-mentioned four points, and from the arguments dis-
cussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the following overall
conclusion can be drawn: for what concerns the substantive outcomes
regarding health protection, European private law not only appears
humane enough, but also enhances the protection offered by national
law. This is notwithstanding legitimate critiques directed at the overall
approach of the CJEU and other EU policy makers for failing to couch
this rather ‘humane’ achievement in more explicit fundamental rights
language.129
128 I A Glinos, R Baeten, M Helble, et al. 2010. ‘A Typology of Cross-Border Patient
Mobility’ (2010) 16(6) Health and Place 1145–1155.
129 See for an example of such a critique: R O’ Gorman, ‘The ECHR, the EU and the
Weakness of Social Rights Protection at the European Level’ (2011) 12(10) German Law
Journal 1833–1861.
fundamental rights and humaneness 129
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924795.006
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 13 Mar 2017 at 14:22:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924795.006
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 13 Mar 2017 at 14:22:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
